Hussein's Iraq do if the international community does not lift the sanctions placed against it?
What foreign policy effects will result from the impending demise of Deng Hsiao-ping? Questions such as these cannot be answered by abstract actorgeneral theory, unless it is integrated with concrete actor-specific theory. Even before the end of the Cold War, Richard Herrmann (1988:177) noted that, precisely because very few real-world, real-time international problems are adequately dealt with at the abstract level, "it is not surprising that many realists have abandoned the high ground of the macro-level and have come down to the trenches of real political analysis."
This article provides an overview of the field of foreign policy analysis, examining its research core and its evolution to date. It presents a genealogy of FPA, suggesting how its roots have led to three different approaches to the study of foreign policy decision making and three different types of knowledge. Each of these streams of FPA adds to our understanding of why certain foreign policy decisions are made at particular points in time. The article also looks to the future, not only of FPA itself, but to the implications that future developments in FPA may have for the study of international relations.
Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday: Roots
The study of internation or interstate relations is as old as the existence of nationstates themselves. Foreign policy analysis as a distinct and consciously theoretical enterprise, however, did not exist before World War II. FPA is fundamentally a theoretical enterprise informed by empirical investigation; it focuses on making at least part of one's knowledge generalizable and applicable cross-nationally (within certain limits). Atheoretical descriptions or prescriptions for foreign policy, as well as explanations that are not even minimally generalizable, are excluded.
An examination of the beginnings of FPA suggests that three works form the foundation or, perhaps better, the roots of this field: * "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" by James N. Rosenau (1966) Each of these works played a major role in launching a different aspect of FPA research as we know it today. James Rosenau's pretheorizing encouraged scholars to tease out cross-nationally applicable generalizations about the foreign policy behavior of states in a systematic and scientific fashion. As Rosenau (1966:98-9) put it:
To identify factors is not to trace their influence. To understand processes that affect external behavior is not to explain how and why they are operative under certain circumstances and not under others. To recognize that foreign policy is shaped by internal as well as external factors is not to comprehend how the two intermix or to indicate the conditions under which one predominates over the other.... Foreign policy analysis lacks comprehensive systems of testable generalizations.... Foreign policy analysis is devoid of general theory.
Rosenau felt that general, testable theory was needed, and the intent of his article was to point out the direction in which he believed it lay. The general theory Rosenau advocated, however, was not the grand theory of Cold War IR. The metaphor Rosenau used is instructive in this regard: FPA researchers should emulate Gregor Mendel, the father of modern genetics, who was able to differentiate types of plants through careful observation and comparison. Translated to FPA, Rosenau wondered if there are distinct types of nation-states, knowledge of which would confer explanatory and predictive power on our models of foreign policy interaction. He encouraged the development of middle-range theory-theory that mediated between grand principles and the complexity of reality. At the time, Rosenau felt the best way to uncover such middle-range generalizations was through aggregate statistical exploration and confirmation. He also underscored the need to integrate information at several levels of analysis-from individual leaders to the international system. For Rosenau, explanations of foreign policy needed to be multilevel and multicausal, synthesizing information from a variety of social science knowledge systems.
In contrast, the work of Richard Snyder and his colleagues inspired researchers to look within the nation-state level of analysis and to emphasize the players involved in making foreign policy:
We adhere to the nation-state as the fundamental level of analysis, yet we have discarded the state as a metaphysical abstraction. By emphasizing decision making as a central focus we have provided a way of organizing the determinants of action around those officials who act for the political society. Decision makers are viewed as operating in a dual-aspect setting so that apparently unrelated internal and external factors become related in the actions of the decision makers. Hitherto, precise ways of relating domestic factors have not been adequately developed (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, 1954:53). In taking this approach, Snyder and his colleagues bequeathed to FPA its characteristic emphasis on foreign policy decision making as opposed to foreign policy outcomes. According to them (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, 1954:12), "If one wishes to probe the 'why' questions underlying the events, conditions, and interaction patterns which rest upon state action, then decision-making analysis is certainly necessary. We would go so far as to say that the 'why' questions cannot be answered without analysis of decision-making." Decision making was best viewed as "organizational behavior," which took into account the spheres of competence of the actors involved, the flow of communication and information, and the motivations of the various players. Thus, like Rosenau, Snyder and his colleagues believed that explanations of behavior were of necessity both multicausal and interdisciplinary.
Harold and Margaret Sprout sought to add reality to the analysis of foreign policy in a different way: by contextualizing it. Their contribution to the formation of the field suggested that understanding foreign policy outputs (which they associated with the analysis of power capabilities within an interstate system) without reference to foreign policy undertakings (which they associated with strategies, decisions, and intentions) was misguided. "Explanations of achievement and estimations of capabilities for achievement invariably and necessarily presuppose antecedent undertakings or assumptions regarding undertakings. Unless there is an undertaking, there can be no achievement-and nothing to explain or estimate" (Sprout and Sprout, 1965:225) . To explain undertakings, the researcher needed to look at the psycho-milieu of the individuals and groups making a foreign policy decision. The psycho-milieu is the international context as perceived and interpreted by decision makers. Incongruities between the perceived and the objective international environments can occur, leading to less than satisfactory choices in foreign policy. The sources of these incongruities were diverse, once again requiring multicausal explanations drawn from a variety of fields. Even in these early years, the Sprouts saw a clear difference between foreign policy analysis and actor-general theory:
Instead of drawing conclusions regarding an individual's probable motivations and purposes, his environmental knowledge, and his intellectual processes linking purposes and knowledge, on the basis of assumptions as to the way people are likely on the average to behave in a given social context, the cognitive behavioralist-be he narrative historian or systematic social scientist-undertakes to find out as precisely as possible how specific persons actually did perceive and respond in particular contingencies (Sprout and Sprout, 1965:118) .
The combined message of these three works was powerful in its appeal to scholars interested in analyzing states' foreign policy behavior. The theoretical impact of these pieces is summarized in the following propositions: * knowledge about the particularities of the people making foreign policy decisions is critical to understanding the nature of these choices; * information about these particularities needs to be incorporated as instances of larger categories of variation in the process of building cross-national, middle-range theory; * multiple levels of analysis, ranging from the most micro to the macro, should be integrated in the service of such theory building; * concepts and theories from all the social sciences can contribute to this theorybuilding endeavor; * understanding the foreign policymaking process is at least as important, if not more important, than understanding foreign policy outputs.
The substance of this message was and continues to be the hard core of FPA. Other parts of the message were more temporally bounded. For example, methodological stances that seemed self-evident in the early 1960s have not stood the test of time. They engendered troubling paradoxes that plagued the field and led to a temporary decline in some areas between the mid-and late-1980s. Despite these paradoxes, those who first built on these seminal works from the late 1960s to the 1980s-the first generation of FPA researchers-built an enduring intellectual foundation.
Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday: First Generation
The energy and enthusiasm that characterized the first generation of work in FPA brought about great strides in conceptualization-the results of which still play a vital role today. They also resulted in significant efforts in data collection and experimentation with various methodologies. The overview that follows includes a representative sampling of research that both examines how the "specifics" of nations lead to differences in foreign policy choice/behavior and puts forward propositions that have the potential to be generalizable and applicable crossnationally. There is no pretense that all relevant works have been included. The works themselves are grouped according to the exemplar-Rosenau (comparative foreign policy), Snyder et al. (foreign policy decision making), or the Sprouts (foreign policy context)-on which they appear to build. This categorization scheme, however, does not imply that a specific scholar perceived his/her work as a conscious attempt to forward the research agenda of a particular exemplar. The categorization serves only as a heuristic device.
Comparative Foreign Policy
Those who took up Rosenau's challenge, to build a cross-national and multilevel theory of foreign policy and to subject that theory to rigorous aggregate empirical testing, created the area of study known as comparative foreign policy (CFP). It is in CFP that we most directly see the legacy of behavioralism in FPA's genealogy. Whereas foreign policy could not be studied in the aggregate, foreign policy behavior could. Searching for an analog to the "vote," which had become the fundamental explanandum in behavioralist American political studies, CFP researchers proposed the foreign policy "event." The event is the tangible artifact of the influence attempt that is foreign policy. This conceptualization of the dependent variable was essential to the theorybuilding enterprise of CFP. To uncover lawlike generalizations, one would have to conduct empirical testing across different types of nations and across time; case studies were not an efficient methodology for this purpose. With the conceptual breakthrough of the event, however, it was now possible to collect data on a variety of possible explanatory factors and determine (by analyzing the variance in the events' behavioral dimensions) the patterns by which these independent variables were correlated with foreign policy behavior (McGowan and Shapiro, 1973) . Indeed, some scholars involved in CFP research seemed to believe that the goal was the creation of a "grand unified theory" that could take into account a variety of foreign policy behaviors across different types of states and points in time. Some set of master equations would link together all the relevant variables, independent and dependent, and, when applied to massive data bases, would yield R-squares approaching 1.0. Although the goal was perhaps naive in its ambition, the sheer enormousness of the task called forth immense efforts in theory building, data collection, and methodological innovation that have few parallels in the study of IR. It should be noted that bureaucratic politics research gained impetus from the Vietnam War, which was ongoing during this period, because that war was seen by the public as defense policy gone astray due, in part, to bureaucratic imperatives (Krasner, 1971) .
Overall, research on groups, organizational processes, and bureaucratic politics showed how "rational" foreign policymaking can be upended by the political entities through which decision makers must work. These entities put their own survival at the top of their list of priorities. This survival is measured by such things as relative influence vis-a-vis other organizations, the level of the organization's budget, and the morale of its personnel. Groups jealously guard and seek to increase their influence. They seek to preserve undiluted what they feel is their "essence" or "mission." Large organizations develop standard operating procedures (SOPs), which, while allowing them to react reflexively despite their inherent unwieldiness, permit little flexibility or creativity. These SOPs may be the undoing of innovative solutions devised by decision makers at levels above such organizations, but there is little alternative to the implementation of policy by bureaucracy. The interface between policy objectives and policy implementation is directly met at this point. When there is incompatibility among the players' perspectives, there may be substantial slippage between the two. Under certain conditions-high stress, high uncertainty, dominant position in foreign policy decision making-the personal characteristics of the individual leader can become central in understanding foreign policy choice (Hermann, 1972; Holsti, 1989) . Harold Lasswell's (1930 Lasswell's ( , 1948 ) writings on political leadership were a significant influence on many early pioneers studying the effects of leaders on foreign policymaking. Joseph de Rivera's (1968) The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy remains an excellent survey and integration of early attempts to apply psychological and social psychological theory to foreign policy cases. Another early effort at the systematic study of leader effects involved the concept of "operational code," an idea originating with Leites (1951) National and Societal Characteristics. The effects that the national attributes of a country (size, wealth, political accountability, economic system) had on foreign policy received much attention from CFP researchers interested in ascertaining if certain types of foreign policy behavior resulted from particular types of states. The propensity to be involved in war was usually the dependent variable of choice in this work (Rummel, 1972 (Rummel, , 1977 (Rummel, , 1979 , 1973) . Again, CFP found itself being pulled in opposite directions. Was the research goal to say something predictive about a specific nation in a particular set of circumstances (which would be highly policy relevant, but which might closely resemble information from a traditional country expert)? Or was the goal a grand unified theory (which would not be very policy relevant, but which would add scientific understanding to the study of foreign policy)? Attempts to accomplish both with the same research led to products that were unsatisfactory in a scholarly as well as a policy sense.
Hindsight is always twenty/twenty. In retrospect, it does seem clear that to evolve further, CFP needed to jettison (1) the aim of a grand unified theory, and (2) In research on the context in which foreign policy decisions are made, work at the psychological level expanded while work at the societal level contracted. The reason for this bifurcation was again methodological. Psychology provided readymade and effective tools for the study of political psychology; similar tools were not available for the study of political sociology. Understanding how the broader sociocultural-political context within a state contributes to its governmental policymaking (whether domestic or foreign) is, perforce, the domain of comparative politics. The theories and methods in comparative politics, however, are not as highly developed as those in psychology. The attempt to graft "scientific" statistical analyses of variance onto a theory of comparative politics was a failure. More successful were efforts to take existing comparative politics research on a particular nation and integrate these factors into explanations of that nation's foreign policy-for example, borrowing techniques from American politics (such as public opinion surveys) to study domestic political imperatives in the United States on foreign policy issues. Still missing, though, were the conceptual and methodological tools necessary to push past the artificial barrier between comparative politics and international relations that stymied theory development (Gaddis, 1992/93; Zakaria, 1992; Hudson, 1993).
Foreign Policy Analysis Today: A Hundred Flowers Bloom
As researchers involved in foreign policy analysis were working on liberating themselves from these inconsistencies, the world was being liberated from the Cold War. This coincidence was felicitous for FPA. With the great uncertainty and flux that followed the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the actor-specific theory of FPA became more germane not only for understanding why the Cold War ended (Gaddis, 1992/93; Kegley, 1994) but also for dealing with the pressing issues, such as the growth of ethnonationalism, that rose from the embers of the Cold War.
FPA research of the last decade (1985-95) has retained the distinctive theoretical commitments that demarcated its study thirty-five years ago. Included among these are: * a commitment to look below the state level of analysis to actor-specific information; * a commitment to build middle-range theory at the interface between actorgeneral theory and the complexity of the real world; * a commitment to pursue multicausal explanations spanning multiple levels of analysis; * a commitment to utilize theory and findings from across the social sciences; * a commitment to viewing the process of foreign policy decision making as a subject of equal importance to the output.
Nevertheless, the sophistication of both the questions being asked and the means for answering them has grown. Indeed, FPA's ability both to raise and to address questions relevant to the post-Cold War world is greater than it has ever been. In order to see this advance, it is useful to examine specific questions that have evolved from earlier theoretical and methodological issues and to see how specific studies have addressed them. Because the boundaries between comparative foreign policy, foreign policy decision making, and the foreign policy context are not always clear-cut, we have again listed the questions and placed specific works in the areas that seem most relevant. Importantly, FPA research has grown so large that it is impossible to survey the entire literature; as a result, this review is illustrative, not comprehensive.
Comparative Foreign Policy
It is no use raising new questions without knowing whether they can be answered. The challenge facing CFP in contemporary times is to develop innovative new methods to generate useful middle-range theory. Among the issues under consideration are: * Can events data be reconceptualized to be of use to contemporary FPA? * Can FPA utilize methods created to simulate human decision making to integrate complex, unquantifiable data? * Can rational choice models be altered to accommodate actor-specific idiosyncrasies in the specification of utility, choice mechanisms, and choice constraints? * Can models be created that will accept as inputs the actor-specific knowledge generated by country and regional experts working in the comparative politics tradition? * When is actor-specific detail necessary, and when is actor-general theory sufficient to explain and predict foreign policy choices? * Can discursive analysis be used to examine the dynamics of evolving understanding in foreign policy decision making?
Some of the most innovative work in FPA is being done by those wrestling with these key methodological issues. Significant breakthroughs in this area could mean increased strides in the corroboration of theory (and, thus, theory building). Witness the resurgent interest in the potential of events data. In addition to using machine coding to speed up the process (Gerner et al., 1994) , could we also envision a new kind of events data? What if we thought of events data as a chronology of linked actions so researchers could trace the dynamics of action and reaction between nations? Such a chronology would include information on "low politics" transactions like trade flows as well as the more traditional "high politics" interchanges involving treaties and hostilities (Schrodt, 1995) .
Computational modeling is another methodological innovation that is being explored for its use in the simulation of human reasoning. If one theorizes about the role of reasoning, problem representation, learning, memory, discourse, or analogy in foreign policymaking, how could the researcher test the resulting theoretical framework? One approach is to harness the reasoning power of a computer, that can be programmed to function as an analog to a human reasoner. A computer, like a human, is able to integrate and synthesize a vast amount of information, most of which is unquantifiable, and apply rules of judgment to this information in order to produce a choice. With the passing of the Cold War, there has been increased interest in finding ways to include actor-specific information into theories of strategic choice. This is one of three places in which actor-general theory from IR and actor-specific theory from FPA come together today. At issue is how close an actor-general theory can come to FPA without renouncing abstract theory. However, there appear to be many scholars willing to take this risk and to search for a theoretical middle ground between parsimony and complexity (Lebow, 1981; Walt, 1987 Walt, , 1992 ; Cioffi-Revilla, 1991; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Hewitt, Wilkenfeld, and Boyer, 1992; Vertzberger, 1992, 1993; Kim and Bueno de Mesquita, 1993). The work ofJack Levy (1992) on prospect theory illustrates this theoretical direction. Prospect theory, which analyzes choice under risk and examines which choices are pervasive in international politics, would lead us to anticipate that loss aversion is of much higher salience to international actors than expected utility theory would predict. Loss aversion drives prudence in healthy states, but it promotes excessively risky action in deteriorating states. Because of loss aversion, the bargaining space of actors may be much more constrained than rational choice or deterrence models predict.
The idea that FPA theories should be able to incorporate the insights and information of country and regional experts is not new. What is new is the desire and the ability to do so over multiple levels of analysis simultaneously. Two pieces of research suggest what is being tried. Each took a framework that examines a different aspect of foreign policymaking-one focused on the nature of the decision unit and its influence on the decision (Hagan, Hermann, and Hermann, 1990) , the other examined how governments respond to domestic political competition using foreign policy (Hudson, Sims, and Thomas, 1993). Both studies then asked country experts to apply their respective framework to a particular case. These researchers recognized the importance of country expertise in providing the detailed insights necessary to determine if their frameworks have validity cross-nationally. The frameworks guide the case analysis, but they can, in turn, be modified based on what is learned from investigating a series of cases. Thus, traditional and behavioral approaches coexist and strengthen one another in the process.
Foreign Policy Decision Making
The first two generations of research in foreign policy decision making were devoted to establishing the legitimacy of focusing on group decision-making structures and processes, and of developing theoretical perspectives to explain typical patterns of small and large group behavior observed in the real world. The third generation of research has begun to unpack the cognitive tasks that groups engage in, asking such questions as: (Herek, Janis, and Huth, 1987; McCauley, 1989; Ripley, 1989; 't Hart, 1990; Gaenslen, 1992) . Richly detailed case studies making use of declassified U.S. documents and tape transcripts (Purkitt, 1992) , or researched with the active assistance of a country expert (Stewart, Hermann, and Hermann, 1989) , have altered the way we look at group decision making. Purkitt (1992), for instance, is able to show that closure on options is a much more tentative and fluid process than previously understood. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, options that had earlier been "ruled out" resurfaced againeven toward the very end of the crisis.
The effects of organizational and bureaucratic forces on foreign policy decision making also continue to be examined. The high data requirements virtually guarantee that the research must be conducted by FPA scholars who are also country experts. Not surprisingly, many analyses of organizations and bureaucracies in foreign policy gravitate toward the military establishment. Exemplars in the U.S. national security field include Hilsman (1987), Kozak and Keagle (1988) , and Wiarda (1990) . Barry Posen (1984) has demonstrated how military doctrine in Britain, France, and Germany was shaped by organizational imperatives and aspirations in the interwar period. Kimberly Zisk (1993) has shown the same for the Soviet Union between 1955 and 1971. There is also a developing literature on organizational and bureaucratic analysis of less developed countries (Korany, 1986; Korany and Dessouki, 1984; Vertzberger, 1984; Korany, 1986) . Analysis of perceptions and images, especially as they are related to war and deterrence, also continues to be an active area of research, but its central questions are evolving to reflect the need to discover the conditions that specify when perceptions are important to know and when they are not. The study of perceptions and their impact on decision making in threat and deterrence situations became a particular focus of attention in the last days of the Cold War (Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, 1985; George and Smoke, 1989; Holsti, 1989; Breslauer, 1990; Lebow and Stein, 1990) . Some researchers have moved to specify how perceptions become linked to form images and to develop image theory (Cottam, 1986; Herrmann, 1993 Herrmann, , 1986 Herrmann, , 1985 Larson, 1993; Walt, 1992) . Herrmann (1993), for example, developed a typology of stereotypical images with reference to Soviet perceptions (the other as "child," as "degenerate," as "enemy," etc.), and has begun to extend his analysis to contemporary Russian, Islamic, and American images. (See also Cottam, 1977.) This research on perceptions and images has caught the attention of those in IR who are modelling strategic choice. As noted above, such models appear to require actor-specific information to be accurate in their forecasts of outcomes.
One type of image theory, which is concerned with national role conceptions, has begun to take on a new importance and energy. There was little work on national role conceptions for some time after K. Holsti's 1970 work. Stephen Walker (1987) and Naomi Wish (1980) kept role theory alive until a younger generation (Breuning, 1992; Cottam and Shih, 1992; Seeger, 1992; Shih, 1993) began to explore its usefulness. Why the new interest in role conceptions? National role conception is one of the few conceptual tools we have for the study of how society and culture serve as a context for a nation's foreign policy. It allows one to bridge the conceptual gap between the general beliefs held in a society and the beliefs of foreign policy decision makers. For example, Breuning (1995) has been able to show that the foreign policy differences between two arguably similar states, Belgium and the Netherlands, are due to major differences in historical experience that have indelibly stamped each nation's conception of the role it plays in international relations to this day.
Why not then go directly to studying cultural influences on foreign policy? The examination of how cultural and social differences shape decision making is just beginning to blossom (Pye, 1986; Sampson, 1987 What happens when we take into consideration the nature of the polity, or political system, in examining how foreign policy is made? How do domestic political imperatives and constraints affect national foreign policy? Putnam (1988) has proposed that foreign policymaking is a "two-level game." A nation's leaders simultaneously play an international game and a domestic game with every move they make in foreign policy. In effect, the leader can strategically use developments at one level to affect choices made at the other. Thus, domestic electoral politics may actually give the leader more, rather than less, leverage in international negotiations. Hagan (1987) Two other identifiable research areas have each taken a unique slant on whether broad differences in polity type lead to discernible differences in nation-state foreign policy. The first has focused on the relationship between political systems and war, seeking to understand why democracies do not, as a rule, fight one another. The second has examined how changes in national regimes affect foreign policy.
Every once in a while a research question will focus the attention of scholars from disparate areas of inquiry, uniting them in the quest for an answer. The "democratic peace" (Russett, 1993a (Russett, , 1993b The question of how regime change affects foreign policy has not quite caught on in the same way as the debate over democracies and war. Nevertheless, there is a small but persistent research effort in this area. The innovative conceptual work of Joe Hagan (1987 Hagan ( , 1993 deserves particular note. Hagan has compiled a large database on the fragmentation and vulnerability of political regimes, with special reference to executive and legislative structures. His purpose is to explore the effects of political opposition on foreign policy choice. Using aggregate statistical analysis, he is able to show, for example, that the internal fragmentation of a regime has substantially less effect on foreign policy behavior than military or party opposition to the regime. Hagan's data set allows him to study this question in an aggregate manner (Hagan, 1995) ; other researchers are employing a more country-specific case study approach (Rosati, Hagan, and Sampson, 1995) .
The end of the Cold War allows FPA scholars to ask how drastic international system change affects what states do in their foreign policy. After all, the system itself is part of the context of decision making. This question has the potential to be integrative: arguably, the effects of system change on a particular state's foreign policy will be mediated by a whole host of factors at various levels of analysis in FPA. Although there have been several attempts to explore the nature of this integration (Hermann, 1990; Rosati, 1994) , descriptive work on this issue has yet to yield any noteworthy advancements. We see FPA as a bridging field linking international relations theory, comparative politics, and the foreign policymaking community. We have already seen evidence that such a bridging process is under way between international relations theory and FPA in at least three areas: (1) the analysis of strategic choice; (2) modelling the two-level game; and (3) explaining the democratic peace. In each case, the role of the FPA scholars has been to begin to specify some of the limiting or scope conditions for the actor-general theory being developed in international relations.
Mutually beneficial interaction is also taking place between FPA and scholars in comparative politics. We are encouraged by the recent efforts to involve country and regional experts in explicating, testing, and refining theories of foreign policy decision making. Foreign policy analysts have also begun to develop country and regional expertise for purposes of obtaining an empirical grounding for their theories. Such knowledge is particularly important because distinctions between foreign and domestic policy have blurred to the point that political science appears to require nothing less than an overall theory of human political choice. FPA theories seem to apply as much to the explanation and projection of domestic policy choice as to foreign policy choice. Personal characteristics of leaders, discourse, problem representation, creativity and learning, advisory processes, bureaucratic politics, legislative politics, societal groups, domestic political imperatives, and so on are as relevant to country and regional experts as to FPA analysts. FPA, with its focus on actor-specific theory, also has potential to "bridge the gap" between the worlds of academia and policymaking. As George (1993:9) has observed:
Practitioners find it difficult to make use of academic approaches such as structural realist theory and game theory, which assume that all state actors are alike and can be expected to behave in the same way in given situations, and which rest on the simple, uncomplicated assumption that states can be regarded as rational unitary actors. On the contrary, practitioners believe they need to work with actor-specific models that grasp the different internal structures and behavioral patterns of each state and leader with which they must deal.
Neither raw theory nor raw detail is readily digestible by those who must respond daily to threatening foreign policy situations. FPA's interweaving of theory with detail can help build the environment that George envisions. To this end, the FPA community can contribute most concretely to the creation of such an environment by pursuing the following goals: * The delineation of scope conditions. When will actor-general theory suffice?
When must actor-specific theory be employed? Some such scope conditions immediately spring to mind from the overview of FPA presented in this article. For example, actor-specific theory is critical when there are serious disagreements within the government about the best foreign policy choice to make (Stewart, Hermann, and Hermann, 1989) . Moreover, specific theory is important when there is an idiosyncratic, culturally shared conception of what is good foreign policy (Breuning, 1995). Without delineating scope conditions, the bridging role will prove more difficult. * The development of dynamic theory. FPA needs to move from the theoretical equivalent of photos to that of motion pictures. How do perceptions change and evolve? How are events seen as part of larger sequences of meaningful interaction between nations? Unless theories can capture the "motion" in international relations, they will have clipped wings-pretty to look at, but fairly useless in application. * The integration of knowledge across multiple levels of analysis. Avowedly integrative studies are few and far between in the present generation of FPA work. Why is this so? Integration must return as a priority in FPA, and scholars working at a particular level of analysis should consider how to incorporate findings from other levels. * The refinement of the dependent variable: foreign policy. Foreign policy as a dependent variable has never been as nuanced as the independent variables used to explain it. In one sense, the dependent variable is overdetermined: there is more possible variation in the independent variables than is possible in the dependent variable. Can we incorporate into the conception of foreign policy enough detail and meaning to warrant the level of specifics demanded by FPA theory? Reconsiderations of events data (Merritt, Muncaster, and Zinnes, 1993; Schrodt, 1995) and the development of discursive analysis and computational modeling may assist in this effort (Hudson, 1991b). * Attention to becoming more policy relevant. Policy relevance will flow naturally from accomplishment of the previous goals. Nevertheless, as we choose our topics and our methods in FPA, we should be alert for opportunities to address complex current issues of real concern to policymakers.
The actor-specific theory produced through foreign policy analysis has enormous theoretical, methodological, and policy potential: a potential that is only starting to be recognized as researchers work to develop theories that facilitate our understanding of why certain foreign policy decisions are made, at particular points in time, by individual decision makers and collectivities of decision makers.
HERMANN, MARGARET G. (1980a) Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using Personal Characteristics of

